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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 





JOSHUA SILFEE, Individually and on  




AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING, INC.; 
ERG STAFFING SERVICE, LLP, 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-15-cv-00023) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 26, 2017 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, ROTH, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 






                                                 
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
ERG Staffing Services, Inc. appeals the District Court’s order denying its motions 
to compel arbitration and to dismiss. Because the District Court erroneously ruled on 
ERG’s motion to dismiss before resolving its motion to compel arbitration, we will 
vacate and remand.  
I 
 Appellee Joshua Silfee sued ERG, his former employer, alleging that ERG’s 
payroll practices violated Pennsylvania law. ERG filed a motion to compel arbitration 
pursuant to Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arguing that the arbitration 
agreement between Silfee and ERG’s payroll vendor precluded Silfee’s suit against ERG. 
The District Court opted to “delay ruling” on ERG’s motion to compel arbitration, App. 
9, and proceeded to deny ERG’s separately filed motion to dismiss based on the merits of 
Silfee’s state law claim. ERG appealed.  
II1 
 The Federal Arbitration Act manifests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements” and was passed with the purpose of moving litigants “out of court and into 
arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1983). Section 4 of the FAA provides that “[a] party 
                                                 
 1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). We have 
jurisdiction under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). “We exercise plenary review over questions 
regarding the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.” Puleo v. Chase 
Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 2010).  
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aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written 
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court . . . for an order 
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.” 9 
U.S.C. § 4. Because “arbitration is a matter of contract . . . [and is] predicated upon the 
parties’ consent,” a court ruling on a motion to compel under § 4 must first determine if 
the parties intended to arbitrate the dispute. Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, 
L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations and alterations omitted).  
The District Court erred in bypassing this § 4 inquiry to rule on ERG’s motion to 
dismiss. Arbitrability is a “gateway” issue, so “a court should address the arbitrability of 
the plaintiff’s claim at the outset of the litigation.” Reyna v. Int’l Bank of Commerce, 839 
F.3d 373, 378 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added). In deciding a motion to compel 
arbitration, the role of the court “is strictly limited to determining arbitrability and 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate, leaving the merits of the claim and any defenses to the 
arbitrator.” Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 478 (9th Cir. 
1991). Thus, after a motion to compel arbitration has been filed, the court must “refrain 
from further action” until it determines arbitrability. Sharif v. Wellness Int’l Network, 
Ltd., 376 F.3d 720, 726 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). District courts may not alter 
this sequencing: “By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by 
a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed 
to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985). 
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The seeds of the District Court’s confusion may have been sown by our decision 
in Guidotti, where we described “the standard for district courts to apply” when assessing 
motions to compel arbitration. 716 F.3d at 771. In Guidotti, we explained that a district 
court should apply one of two standards, depending on the circumstances. “[W]hen it is 
apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and documents relied upon in the complaint, 
that certain of a party’s claims are subject to an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion 
to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without 
discovery’s delay.” Id. at 776 (alterations and citation omitted). “But if the complaint and 
its supporting documents are unclear regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the 
plaintiff has responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient 
to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue,” the district court may order limited briefing 
and discovery on the issue of arbitrability, then assess the question under the summary 
judgment standard. Id.  
The District Court did not think that Guidotti provided “a clearly-articulated 
standard of review” for this case. App. 9. It reasoned that “a disposition of a motion to 
compel arbitration under the summary judgment standard would be premature in this 
case,” but also thought that using “the 12(b)(6) standard would . . . run afoul of Guidotti 
because such a standard is to be applied only in cases where a party does not question the 
arbitrability or applicability of the arbitration agreement.” Id. Considering itself caught 
between a rock and a hard place, the District Court opted to “delay ruling on [ERG’s] 
motions to compel arbitration until a summary judgment stage when discovery is 
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underway.” Id.  
The District Court committed two errors in this regard. First, it did not recognize 
that the standards laid out in Guidotti are truly dichotomous. Because either the Rule 
12(b)(6) or the Rule 56 standard will apply, there are no circumstances in which Guidotti 
does not provide a “clearly-articulated standard of review.” App. 9. Second, the District 
Court misstated the applicability of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, reasoning that it “is to be 
applied only in cases where a party does not question the arbitrability or applicability of 
the arbitration agreement.” Id. But that interpretation would render the Rule 12(b)(6) 
standard a nullity; if a party has filed a motion to compel arbitration, then the other party 
necessarily questioned arbitrability. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (explaining that a motion to compel 
is filed after “the failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate”). Rather, if a party 
moves to compel arbitration based on an authentic arbitration agreement that is attached 
to the complaint, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is appropriate unless “the plaintiff has 
responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the 
agreement to arbitrate in issue.” Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. 
 Having clarified our holding in Guidotti, we now turn to the facts of this appeal. In 
his complaint, Silfee alleged that ERG violated Pennsylvania law by paying his wages 
through a debit card system that imposed various fees. ERG then submitted the terms and 
conditions that Silfee received from the payroll vendor along with that card, which 
included the arbitration clause at issue in this case. With a concededly authentic 
arbitration agreement attached to the complaint, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard was 
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appropriate unless Silfee produced “additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to 
arbitrate in issue.” Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. He did not do so. Silfee neither denied 
receipt of and assent to the terms and conditions, nor did he seek discovery. Instead, he 
argued that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable by ERG for “pure legal” 
reasons. Silfee Br. 4. Those legal questions—based entirely on documents attached to the 
complaint—do not require additional discovery. Guidotti, 716 F.3d at 776. Thus, the 
District Court should have applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and should do so on 
remand.  
III 
Though both Silfee and ERG urge us to rule on arbitrability, we think it imprudent 
to do so. “It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider 
an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). Here, the 
District Court did not identify—much less analyze—any of the parties’ competing 
arguments regarding arbitrability. Accordingly, we will remand to the District Court for 
consideration of ERG’s motion to compel arbitration in the first instance. 
*  *  * 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District Court and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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